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What Can We Learn from  
EU ETS?
IMPLEMENTING EU GHG EMISSIONS REDUCTION 
TARGETS THROUGH EU ETS
As agreed in Paris in 2015, countries should aim 
together to curb greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
to keep a global rise in temperature well below 
2 degrees Celsius (United Nations 2015). This requires 
a very deep cut in GHG emissions as current levels 
would make a 3 degree rise in temperature in 2050 
very likely. Carbon pricing is widely considered to be 
a crucial tool in reaching targets for deep decarbon­
ization. Indeed, pricing ensures emission reductions 
at the lowest cost to society by offering flexibility in 
the choice of abatement measures and their timing. 
Interestingly, GHG mitigation seems to be rather 
successful within the EU while the EU is also a pio­
neer in carbon pricing around the world. The EU (in ­
cluding the UK) shows an overall decrease of 21 per­
cent in GHG emissions from 1990 levels by 2013. After 
an initial decline in the early 1990s, the reductions 
were largely attained in the aftermath of the eco­
nomic crisis in 2008. Since 2014, GHG emissions have 
stabilized again. Nevertheless, the reduction reflects 
a breakthrough compared with the past, where eco­
nomic growth correlates strongly with higher energy 
use and GHG emissions. Indeed, the GHG intensity of 
GDP fell by even more than 50 percent between 1990 
and 2017.
A key instrument applied by the EU has been its 
explicit carbon pricing policy through carbon allow­
ance trading within the EU Emissions Trading System 
(EU ETS) since 2005. This sys­
tem covers around 40 percent 
of the EU’s total GHG emissions 
and includes three European 
countries outside the EU. EU 
ETS is a typical cap­and­trade 
system inspired by the prac­
tical success of the US SO2 
cap­and­trade scheme in the 
1990s (Burtraw and Szambe­
lan 2009). Its main purpose is 
to reduce GHG emissions in a 
cost­effective way by provid­
ing a clear reduction path­
way for industrial GHGs and 
to allow individual trades in 
carbon allowances between 
firms to find the cheapest 
abatement options. 
In this paper we provide some context behind 
the EU’s effort to implement EU­wide carbon pric­
ing through EU ETS. Next, we discuss several lessons 
that could be drawn from this experience. Note that 
our focus is on EU ETS as the main vehicle for car­
bon pricing; other climate policies, including perfor­
mance standards and subsidies for investment and 
innovation, remain largely untouched. 
CARBON PRICING THROUGH EU ETS
A carbon cap­and­trade program like EU ETS in ­
ternalizes the social costs of GHG emissions into 
(energy) market prices, which would also promote 
further investments in low­carbon technologies. 
EU ETS started with a “learning phase” from 2005 
to 2007 and its design has evolved over the sub­
sequent trading phases (2008–2012, 2013–2020, 
and 2021–2030). To date, EU ETS is the largest emis­
sions trading scheme in the world (World Bank, 
2019). 
Figure 1 provides a concise picture of some key 
performance indicators for EU ETS emissions in the 
past as well as into the future. The figure shows a 
remarkably stable trend in emissions up to a strong 
decline in GHG emissions due to the economic crisis 
in the years 2008–2009. After the crisis, emissions 
never returned to their previous levels and decreased 
by an average 2.5 percent per year. The figure also 
shows an important gap between actual emissions 
and the allowance cap. Because of oversupply dur­
ing the period 2009–2013, the allowance market built 
up a huge “bank” of allowances, i.e. allowances that 
are issued in earlier years but are unused and remain 
valid in later years as they have an infinite lifetime. 
Note that in 2013–2014 the bank exceeded a whole 
year of allowance supply.
The decreasing cap (the dotted red line in 
Figure 1) reflects the ambition of the EU to reduce 



















1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Non-ETS emissions Non-ETS projections
Non-ETS targets (effort sharing legislation) EU ETS (stationary) verified emissions
EU ETS (stationary) projections Allocated EU ETS allowances (stationary)
Notes: Emissions from land use, land-use change, and forestry (LULUCF) and from international bunker fuels are 
excluded. Pre-2005 trends for EU ETS and non-ETS emissions are based on an allocation of 1990–2004 GHG inventory 
data to either the EU ETS or non-ETS sectors at source category level. EU ETS (stationary) emissions for the period 
2005–2018 reflect verified emissions under EU ETS; emissions for the period 2005–2012 were estimated to reflect the 
current scope (2013–2020) of EU ETS.
Source: EEA (2019). © ifo Institute 
GHG Emisions in the EU28
Million tonnes CO2-equivalent
EU ETS cap (stationary)




ifo DICE Report I / 2020 Spring Volume 18
longer run. With the linear reduction factor as 
adopted in the revised EU ETS Directive of 2018, 
the supply of allowances will be zero in 2057. The 
decreasing cap implies that the cap will become 
more and more restrictive. The bank only helps to 
smooth the impact as it provides for intertemporal 
flexibility. 
Figure 1 also illustrates the performance of 
EU ETS relative to the so­called non­ETS sectors. 
Various policy instruments contributed to a decline 
in emissions from these sectors, such as energy 
taxes, emission standards, and subsidies for energy 
efficiency improvements. However, this decline 
is less pronounced compared to EU ETS and even 
turned into a rise of emissions since 2014. In­ 
deed, according to projections, additional reduc­
tions will be required in the 2020s. The flexibility 
mechanisms under the Effort Sharing legislation 
allow member states to sell part of their emission 
allocation for a certain year to another member 
state. Indeed, some member states, like Germany, 
are expected not to meet their non­ETS targets up to 
2020 and will have to buy emission allocations from 
countries that have reduced emissions more than 
required.
Finally, the relevance of EU ETS for carbon pric­
ing within the EU can be illustrated using effective 
carbon rates (OECD 2018). Using a highly disag­
gregated database of energy use and implicit car­
bon taxes as well as cap­and­trade information, 
the OECD presents a concise evaluation of how 
well the carbon emission base is priced (Harding et 
al. 2014). The analysis presents the rates on (fossil 
fuel) energy use in terms of carbon emissions. These 
effective rates do explicitly account for actual car­
bon taxes, specific taxes on energy use, and trad­ 
able emission permit prices in the various count­ 
ries and consider the share of emissions priced at 
various levels. Emissions for which tax rates are 
zero are also included in the 
calculation. Figure 2 presents 
this graph for the whole of 
the EU. 
According to this analysis, 
EU ETS prices most, though 
not all, carbon emissions in 
the power sector and about 
60 percent of those in indus­
try. EU average tax rates for 
road transport and in the res­
idential sector, recalculated 
based upon their underlying 
carbon intensities, are gen­
erally much higher.1 These 
higher rates, in particular the 
mineral oil products gasoline 
and diesel used in the trans­
port sectors, should also be 
linked to other externalities, 
however, such as air quality impacts (Parry and Vol­
lebergh 2017).
FIRST LESSON: THE CAP 
After the “learning by doing” pilot of the first trading 
phase (2005−2007), a key step in setting a cap for the 
EU has been the gradual change from national allo­
cation plans to a common overall approach where EU 
legislation guarantees the cap to be reduced annually 
by roughly 38 million allowances in the third trading 
phase (2013−2020). This corresponds to a so-called 
linear reduction factor (LRF) of 1.74 percent of the 
average total quantity of allowances within the EU. 
This factor has even been further increased to an LRF 
of 2.2 percent in 2018, which would guarantee zero 
additional carbon allowances in 2057. 
Setting the level of the cap and its development 
over time is by far the most important element of 
cap­and­trade policies. The cap limits the overall 
quantity of emissions and therefore guarantees – 
like (enforced) standards – the effectiveness of the 
environmental policy. To what extent this trajectory 
fits optimal climate policy, however, cannot easily 
be derived from a simple cost­benefit evaluation of 
climate policy. Good reasons exist to evaluate the 
trajectory against policy goals as agreed upon inter­
nationally, such as the Paris agreement of 2015 (see 
e.g., Heal and Milner 2014). 
A very important step forward has been the 
change from a fixed to a flexible duration of the 
value of an allowance starting from the second trad­
ing phase onwards. Consequently, firms were able to 
bank their allowances for use in subsequent trading 
periods. A look at Figure 1 shows that demand for 
allowances throughout the second period was below 
1 Note that the figure reflects the relatively low rate for the EU ETS 
in 2015. ETS prices have increased significantly since 2018 (see also 
Figure 3).
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the allocated allowances and 
a very large bank of allow­
ances built up. The bank is 
almost equal to the total sup­
ply of allowances in 2018 and 
allows for intertemporal flexi­
bility at the carbon allowance 
market but does not change 
the overall amount of emis­
sions that are capped during 
the entire period in which the 
policy is effective. 
A related issue has been 
the allowance of “offsets,” 
i.e., the option to allow addi­
tional emissions if they could 
be offset through interna­
tional credits provided by the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI). 
This way, credits for more than 1 billion metric tons 
of CO2 equivalents have been surrendered in phase 2, 
which has been an additional factor explaining the 
overallocation and therefore the growing lack of 
scarcity during the second period (see also Verdonk 
et al. 2013). Moreover, the contribution of CDM pro­
jects to actual emission reduction is challenged as 
well (Ellerman et al. 2015). Although offsets can be 
an important tool to provide flexibility for outside 
options, such as low­cost abatement projects, their 
use should be carefully managed, as the impact of 
CDM has shown. 
The first important lesson is that a cap­and­
trade system like EU ETS is very helpful in guaran­
teeing a credible and binding reduction of emissions 
within the ETS sectors. The gradual yearly reduction 
of allowances is a key element to deliver its promised 
contribution to a long­run deep decarbonization 
within EU ETS, whereas no such guarantee would 
be provided by using a carbon tax instead. Trust in 
the system is essential and the fact that EU ETS is 
firmly established in European law is very helpful 
and guarantees its participants the rule of law. Fur­
ther ambitions, such as expressed by the European 
Green Deal, are best implemented by increasing the 
LRF. Also, prudence in using offsets is essential as the 
experience within EU ETS has not been convincing. 
SECOND LESSON: TRADE
The second key element of any cap­and­trade sys­
tem is the option for individual firms to trade. In 
other words, with enough scarcity in the market, 
trades will occur between those who have a surplus 
of allowances and those who are in actual need for 
compliance at a given point in time. Indeed, the 
overall supply determines the number of allowances 
becoming available for trade, but trading between 
market participants occurs only if buyers need allow­
ances for short­run compliance or long­run hedg­
ing. Indeed, trade has been much easier since the 
change that meant allowances remain valid indefi­
nitely. Banking strongly increases market liquidity as 
this allows for the possibility to trade against future 
expected emissions and firms can individually opti­
mize compliance over their entire planning horizon 
(Ellerman et al. 2015). 
For almost the entire phase 2, EU ETS has suf­
fered from a lack of scarcity, however. In addition 
to the economic crisis in 2008–2009 and the use of 
international credits, the impact of renewables and 
energy efficiency policies also played a role here 
(Koch et al. 2014). Both energy efficiency improve­
ments and an increased share of renewable energy 
reduce demand for allowances because energy use 
and the generation of electricity were mainly fossil 
fuel based. National policies supporting the deploy­
ment of renewable energy technologies in the EU 
have also been an important driver of emission 
reductions in the EU ETS sector electricity (Van den 
Bergh et al. 2013). 
Due to this relative lack of scarcity in the carbon 
market in phase 2, prices were rather low for a very 
long time (see Figure 3). This collapse of the carbon 
price ignited a heated debate to neutralize the lack of 
scarcity in the market (see also Ellerman et al. 2016). 
In particular, support grew for the idea of introduc­
ing a minimum price or even a price collar within EU 
ETS (e.g. Burtraw et al. 2010). Policymakers in the 
EU followed another approach by setting up quan­
tity­based interventions, such as backloading and 
the so­called Market Stability Reserve (MSR) agreed 
upon in 2018. 
The idea behind the MSR can be summarized as 
a quantity­based rule: if the total number of allow­
ances in circulation is 
‒ less than 400 million in a year, then the MSR 
releases 100m allowances into circulation in the 
following year;
‒ between 400 million and 833 million, then the mar­
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‒ greater than 833 million, then the MSR will reduce 
the volume of allowances auctioned in the subse­
quent year by 12 percent of allowances in circu­
lation (note that during the first years of opera­
tion, i.e., 2019–2023, the absorption rate will be 
24 percent).
The core impact of the MSR is its governance of the 
excess quantity in the bank of allowances. This fea­
ture will reduce the overall supply of allowances by a 
substantial amount if the bank gets “too large.” 
The MSR reform invoked a heated debate among 
economists about its impact and effectiveness. 
Some argue that the MSR’s core feature would make 
the EU ETS emissions cap a function of market out­
comes (Perino et al. 2019). Others suggest that the 
MSR would inevitably lead to a new Green Paradox 
and increase total emissions (Gerlagh et al. 2019). To 
what extent the MSR quantity­based mechanism will 
have an impact on the overall amount of allowances 
is not easy to judge, however. One should be very 
careful when deciding against what counterfactual 
to evaluate its impact. 
As shown by Perino et al. (2019), the supposed 
impact of the MSR rules depends on the points in 
time when the MSR is predicted to become effec­
tive and stops taking in allowances when the bank 
is depleted “enough.” Demand for allowances, how­
ever, is notoriously difficult to predict. Not only do 
uncertain macroeconomic developments have an 
impact, but also overlapping policies and assump­
tions on the carbon abatement cost in the future. 
It should not come as a surprise that estimates for 
allowance cancellations in the literature range from 
2 billion to 16 billion allowances (Perino and Willner 
2017; Bruninx et al. 2019). 
Whatever the outcome of the debate, the MSR 
reform has already had an impact on the carbon price 
in practice. Since the MSR together with the stricter 
LRF were implemented into European law in 2018, 
allowance prices have surged up to EUR 25 on aver­
age in 2019 (see Figure 3). This suggests that the mar­
ket expects future scarcity to increase, which casts 
its shadow through this price hike. Such an impact 
would have been unlikely if the market believed that 
these measures would be ineffective. In other words, 
the impact of the new MSR rules is relevant but 
should also not be exaggerated. Moreover, the rules 
of the MSR itself are subject to updating because the 
MSR will be reviewed in five­year intervals.
The lesson on trade is that providing enough 
flexibility in a cap­and­trade system is essential 
but should also be guided with care. Intertemporal 
trade is key to a well­functioning market but might 
also lead to low prices if allowances are abundant. 
Ad ditional measures in such circumstances are 
unavoidable for the system to remain a credible 
instrument for carbon pricing and to have impact 
on current market and future investment decisions. 
We believe that for newly introduced cap­and­trade 
systems, some degree of hybridity is essential, 
either through a price collar or quantity rules such 
as the rules in the MSR. Both mechanisms help to 
steer cap­and­trade programs in the event of unex­
pected shocks and unanticipated overlapping pol­
icies, although a price collar has the advantage of 
more transparency. 
THIRD LESSON: COVERAGE WITHIN THE OVERALL 
CLIMATE PRICING POLICY APPROACH
Figure 2 illustrates that EU ETS is an important 
cross­cutting tool for pricing carbon from the use 
of fossil fuels within the EU. Its carbon price “base” 
covers most emissions within the electricity sector 
and in energy­intensive industry. Indeed, the idea 
was originally to limit EU ETS to large combustion 
installations only, such as installations with a total 
rated thermal input exceeding 20 MW. Including 
smaller installations would become too costly in 
terms of transaction cost and taxes on mineral oils 
already account for the implicit pricing of carbon in 
the so­called non­ETS sectors (see also Vollebergh 
et al. 1997). 
This hybrid approach towards using two differ­
ent policy instruments for carbon pricing is occa­
sionally challenged. For instance, the European 
Green Deal of the European Commission argues for 
including the maritime sector in EU ETS (EC, 2019). 
Some economists go much further and argue in favor 
of extending EU ETS to the transport sector (Hepburn 
and Toytelboym 2017; Creutzig et al. 2010). 
The idea of an upstream inclusion of transport 
fuels into ETS has the benefit of simplicity in provid­
ing an EU­wide instrument to guarantee equal car­
bon abatement costs across the economy. Indeed, 
carbon emissions are directly linked to the carbon 
content of transport fuels, mainly mineral oils. Exten­
sion would be easy by including upstream refineries 
and importers of refined fuels into the system. 
Extensions make sense for sectors that are not 
yet subject to any carbon price, such as shipping and, 
previously, air transport. Although an (implicit) car­
bon tax on fuel or kerosene would be a good alterna­
tive, inclusion in EU ETS certainly improves welfare. 
Less obvious, however, is to see why such a policy 
would be preferable if fuels are already subject to an 
implicit carbon tax.2 
First, Figure 2 shows that including transport 
fuels and other sectors in ETS would result in a 
much larger overlap of existing (implicit) carbon 
pricing policies. Overlapping instruments may have 
strong negative impacts on both effectiveness and 
2 The overall welfare impact of such a carbon price reform policy 
would depend on both incentives and transaction costs, which, in 
turn, also depend on both upstream and downstream abatement 
options and cost. Note that the subsequent reasoning does not ap­
ply to the inclusion of intra­EU flights in EU ETS since 2012, as  
kerosene was largely unpriced.
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efficiency. Using an applied CGE model, Brink et al. 
(2016) show how (additional) EU carbon taxes simply 
crowd out the cap­and­trade policy if the two poli­
cies interact on the same carbon emission base. 
Second, if the emissions trading system for the 
transport sector will replace existing fuel taxes, most 
likely the carbon price of fuel use will decrease, as 
current fuel taxes are much higher than the price of 
EU ETS allowances. Given the relatively high marginal 
cost of reducing emissions in the transport sector, 
it will be more attractive to buy allowances than to 
reduce emissions. This would shift abatement from 
the transport sector to other sectors covered by EU 
ETS, increasing fuel use and making electrification of 
cars more difficult.
Third, such a switch would also increase local 
air pollution. Extending EU ETS to road transport 
would make the ETD redundant from a carbon policy 
perspective. However, fuel taxes cannot be removed 
totally, as member states still use their fuel taxes for 
other transport­related externalities such as air pol­
lution and congestion (Parry and Vollebergh 2017). 
One could wonder why the current boundaries of 
carbon emissions associated with large combustion 
within EU ETS should in any case be changed. The 
tendency in several non­ETS sectors is towards elec­
trification, such as electric cars or the use of (elec­
tric) heat pumps. This development is the result of 
targeted policies in those sectors, such as the grad­
ual rise in stringency in the EU­wide fuel standards 
for car companies. Moreover, expanding electrifica­
tion will shift demand away from mineral oils to elec­
tricity, which is already covered by EU ETS. 
The lesson on coverage of sectors is that the 
choice to focus on large installations makes a lot of 
sense from an overall welfare perspective. It is far 
from obvious why EU ETS should cover the entire car­
bon emissions base. Including small­scale installa­
tions and other hard­to­monitor individual emitters 
might simply be too costly if other instruments, like 
(implicit) carbon taxes and standards, are already 
available. This argument holds even if potential 
upstream options, such as the inclusion of implicit 
emissions through refinery products, are available. 
FOURTH LESSON: IMPACT ON CARBON EMISSIONS, 
LEAKAGE, AND INCREASED EFFORTS
The EU ETS cap guarantees reductions in carbon 
emissions in the long run as it settles a carbon budget 
within the EU over time. This budget is enforceable as 
long as the system is kept intact, even though its flex­
ibility allows actual carbon emissions to be different 
from the annual emissions cap in a specific year. 
Indeed, the overall trend in carbon emissions within 
the EU over the last decade is decreasing, as Figure 1 
demonstrates. This overall downward trend follows 
from the decreasing emissions trend within the EU 
ETS sectors, in particular the electricity sector. 
It is still unclear to what extent EU ETS has con­
tributed to this downward trend. In particular, the 
increased deployment of renewable energy technol­
ogies boosted by national policies, often in the form 
of feed­in tariffs and premiums, has likely been the 
primary driver in emission reductions in this sec­
tor. However, EU ETS also increased the cost of car­
bon­intensive production and it may have contrib­
uted by encouraging short­run fuel switching from 
coal to natural gas (Delarue et al. 2010) and by chang­
ing long­run expectations of returns on investments 
in carbon­intensive projects.3 Dechezleprêtre et al. 
(2018) find evidence for carbon emission reductions 
through EU ETS in the order of − 10 percent between 
2005 and 2012 by comparing installations whose 
production capacity is above the inclusion threshold 
(and therefore became regulated by EU ETS) with 
those that are below the threshold but are otherwise 
similar. In addition, Calel and Dechezleprêtre (2016) 
show that EU ETS has increased low­carbon innova­
tion among regulated firms.
These trends do not show the potential impact 
of EU ETS on carbon leakage. Carbon leakage occurs 
if a reduction in domestic carbon emissions is offset 
to some extent by increasing emissions in countries 
where climate mitigation policy is absent or less 
stringent. According to several studies, such leakage 
impacts can be substantial (Böhringer et al. 2010; 
Bollen et al. 2012). Empirical estimates also suggest 
a gradual shift of carbon gravity towards countries 
like China and South Korea (Aichele and Felbermayr 
2012). Although developed countries have reduced 
their territorial emissions, this effect is at least par­
tially offset by importing embodied carbon (UNEP 
2019). Such carbon leakage poses a serious threat 
to uncoordinated climate policies, not only in the EU 
but also in other developed countries.
Leakage issues become even more pressing if 
one looks at recent EU efforts to align its efforts with 
the ambitions of the Paris agreement. The imposi­
tion of stricter measures on EU carbon emissions to 
aim at worldwide net zero carbon emissions in 2050 
has recently received a boost by the EU initiative of a 
Green Deal. This initiative is strongly supported by a 
growing number of EU member states who advocate 
for EU climate policy to be more ambitious, or by a 
coalition of the willing of intra­EU member states at 
least. 
It is important, though, to understand that 
despite several efforts to cap worldwide GHG emis­
sions, such as the Kyoto protocol in 1997, overall 
yearly GHG emissions have doubled since 1990 and 
the global trend is still upward instead of downward. 
An exception in this world of growing emissions, 
however, is the EU. Despite a yearly economic growth 
3 Note also that EU ETS has an impact on the effectiveness of 
renewables policies: a carbon price reduces the cost difference 
between fossil­fuel­based electricity and electricity from renewable 
energy sources (Verdonk et al. 2013).
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of 1.8 percent, emissions of GHGs declined annually 
by 0.9 percent on average between 1990 and 2018. 
Nevertheless it is still a challenge to continue this 
trend into the future, as Figure 1 illustrates. Further­
more, even with the increased LRF of 2.2 percent 
agreed upon in 2018, GHG emissions within EU ETS 
will still be somewhat higher than the level required 
for carbon neutrality in 2050 while the EU ETS price 
is well below the discounted social cost of carbon for 
2020 (OECD 2018).4 
Whatever the initiative for further emissions 
reductions, any additional measures on top of exist­
ing EU policy would benefit strongly from better 
coordination of international carbon pricing policies 
or, in the absence of such coordination, by imple­
menting policies such as border price adjustments to 
prevent a carbon race to the bottom. Such coordina­
tion is particularly important for exposed industries 
such as the manufacturing industry that are part of 
EU ETS. Currently, the risk of carbon leakage from EU 
ETS is addressed by free allocation of allowances to 
industries that are vulnerable to competition from 
outside the EU. And some member states compen­
sate companies for the increase in electricity costs 
due to EU ETS. 
The lesson here is that carbon pricing through 
EU ETS has contributed to the clear downward trend 
in carbon emissions within the EU, although subsi­
dies for cleaner electricity generation have played 
a large role as well. However, we also observe a 
gradual tendency to outsource emissions to other 
regions, which consequently increases the carbon 
footprint of our consumption. With further initiatives 
to increase stringency ahead, it is a logical next step 
to invest more resources in a carbon border adjust­
ment mechanism for selected sectors to ensure that 
the price of imports will more accurately reflect 
their carbon content and to reduce the risk of car­
bon leakage. 
CONCLUSION 
The EU is aiming for climate neutrality by 2050. For 
this purpose, stricter carbon pricing policies seem 
to be key. With its clear reduction pathway for CO2 
emissions up to 2030 and beyond, EU ETS provides 
firms a clear and credible incentive to reduce emis­
sions. Indeed, EU ETS is the only instrument cur­
rently implemented within the EU framework on 
climate and energy policy that imposes a hard limit 
on carbon emissions and guarantees the application 
of a carbon emissions budget. While allowing partic­
ipants to also trade their allowances, however the 
system also provides a cost­efficient way of reducing 
GHGs from a variety of large sources. 
4 In its recent study the OECD also includes a price reference rate to 
explore so­called carbon pricing gaps (OECD 2018). The carbon pric­
ing gap not only includes price base gaps but also takes into account 
an estimated social cost of carbon. 
Empirical studies confirm that EU ETS contrib­
uted to emission reductions as well as innovation in 
low­carbon technologies even when the carbon price 
was relatively modest. After years of relatively low 
allowance prices, however, the recent revision of the 
EU ETS directive contributed to an unprecedented 
price rise, with the price also likely to rise even fur­
ther in the future due to the decreasing cap. Higher 
carbon prices will further promote investments in 
technologies that are required for the EU to achieve 
its long­term target of a low­carbon society by 2050. 
Extending coverage of EU ETS to current non­
ETS sectors such as transport or buildings is a less 
obvious step for us. Most of fossil fuel­based heating 
and motor fuels will gradually give way to electric­
ity. If this electricity is generated by fossil fuel­fired 
power plants, the associated emissions will be cov­
ered by EU ETS, and otherwise the impact on carbon 
emissions is clearly positive. Instead of focusing on 
the extension of EU ETS towards non­ETS sectors, 
efficient carbon policies seem to benefit much more 
from efforts to align existing implicit carbon taxes 
with the broad set of externalities relevant for these 
combustion processes. 
REFERENCES 
Aichele, R. and G. Felbermayer (2012), “Kyoto and the Carbon Footprint 
of Nations”, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 63(3), 
336−54.
Böhringer, C., C. Fischer, and K. E. Rosendahl (2010), “The Global Effects of 
Subglobal Climate Policies”, B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy 
10(2). 
Bollen J., C. Brink, P. Koutstaal, P. Veenendaal, and H. Vollebergh (2012), 
“Trade and Climate Change: Leaking Pledges”, CESifo DICE Report 10, 
44−51.
Brink, C., H. R. J. Vollebergh, and E. van der Werf (2016), “Carbon Pricing 
in the EU: Evaluation of Different EU ETS Reform Options”, Energy Policy 
97, 603−17.
Bruninx K., M. Ovaere, K. Gillingham, and E. Delarue (2019), “The Unin­
tended Consequences of the EU ETS Cancellation Policy”, Munich Personal 
RePEc Archive (MPRA) Paper no. 96437.
Burtraw, D. and S. Szambelan (2009), “US Emissions Trading Markets for 
SO2 and NOx “, Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 09−40.
Burtraw, D., K. Palmer, and D. Kahn (2010), “A Symmetric Safety Valve”, 
Energy Policy 38, 4921−32. 
Calel, R. and A. Dechezleprêtre (2016), “Environmental Policy and Directed 
Technological Change: Evidence from the European Carbon Market”, 
Review of Economics and Statistics 9 (1), 173−91
Creutzig, F., E. McGlynn, J. Minx, and O. Edenhofer (2011), “Climate Pol­
icies for Road Transport Revisited (I): Evaluation of the Current Frame­
work”, Energy Policy 39(5), 2396–406.
Dechezleprêtre, A. and D. Popp (2017), “Fiscal and Regulatory Instruments 
for Clean Technology Development in the European Union”, in I. Parry, K. 
Pittel and H. Vollebergh, eds., Energy Tax and Regulatory Policy in Europe: 
Reform priorities, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 167−214.
Dechezleprêtre, A., D. Nachtigall, and F. Venmans (2018), “The Joint 
Impact of the European Union Emissions Trading System on Carbon Emis­
sions and Economic Performance”, OECD Economics Department Working 
Papers no. 1515.
Delarue E. D., A. D. Ellerman, and W. D. d’Haeseleer (2010), “Short­Term 
CO2 Abatement in the European Power Sector: 2005–2006”, Climate 
Change Economics 01, 113−33. 
EC (2018a), “Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 11 December 2018 on the Promotion of the Use of Energy 




ifo DICE Report I / 2020 Spring Volume 18
EC (2018b), “Directive (EU) 2018/2002 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 11 December 2018 amending Directive 2012/27/EU on 
Energy Efficiency”, Official Journal of the European Union L328/61, 210−30.
EC (2019), “Communication from the Commission to the European Par­
liament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions – The European 
Green Deal”, COM(2019) 640 final, Brussels.
Ellerman, D., V. Valero, and A. Zaklan (2015), “An Analysis of Allowance 
Banking in the EU ETS”, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
(RSCAS) Research Paper no. 2015/29.
Ellerman, D., C Marcantonini, and A. Zaklan (2016), “The European Union 
Emissions Trading System: Ten Years and Counting”, Review of Environ-
mental Economics and Policy 10 (1), 89–107.
Gerlagh, R., R. J. R. K. Heijmans, and K. E. Rosendahl (2019), “Endogenous 
Emission Caps Always Induce a Green Paradox”, CESifo Working Paper 
no. 786.
Heal, G. and A. Millner (2014), “Uncertainty and Decision Making in Cli­
mate Change Economics”, Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 
8 (1), 120–37
Hepburn, C. and E. Toytelboym (2017), “Reforming the EU ETS – Where Are 
We Now?”, in I. Parry, K. Pittel, and H. R. J. Vollebergh, eds., Energy Tax and 
Regulatory Policy in Europe: Reform Priorities, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1−28.
Koch N., S. Fuss, G. Grosjean, and O. Edenhofer (2014), “Causes of the 
EU ETS Price Drop: Recession, CDM, Renewable Policies or a Bit of Every­
thing? – New Evidence”, Energy Policy 73, 676−85.
OECD (2018), Effective Carbon Rates 2018: Pricing Carbon Emissions 
Through Taxes and Emissions Trading, OECD Publishing, Paris.
Parry, I., K. Pittel, and H. R. J. Vollebergh (2017), Energy Tax and Regula-
tory Policy in Europe: Reform Priorities, MIT Press, Chicago.
Perino, G., R. A. Ritz, and A. van Benthem (2019), “Understanding Over­
lapping Policies: Internal Carbon Leakage and the Punctured Waterbed”, 
NBER Working Paper no. 25643.
Vollebergh H. R. J., J. de Vries, and P. Koutstaal (1997), “Hybrid Carbon 
Incentive Mechanisms and Political Acceptability”, Environmental and 
Resource Economics 9, 43−63.
United Nations (2015), Paris Agreement, December 2015, https://unfccc.
int/process­and­meetings/the­paris­agreement/the­paris­agreement.
UNEP (2019), Emissions Gap Report 2019, United Nations Environment 
Programme, Nairobi. 
Van den Bergh K., E. Delarue, and W. D’haeseleer (2013), “Impact of 
Renewables Deployment on the CO2 Price and the CO2 Emissions in the 
European Electricity Sector”, Energy Policy 63, 1021−31.
Verdonk, M., C. Brink, H. R. J. Vollebergh, and M. Roelfsema (2013), Evalu-
ation of policy options to reform the EU Emissions Trading System Effects on 
carbon price, emissions and the economy, PBL, The Hague. 
World Bank (2019), State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2019, World Bank, 
Washington, DC.
